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ABSTRACT
In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal
realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the
general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the
debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.
1. Introduction
In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the
debate between causal realism and causal constructivism. This is the
most general debate with respect to the metaphysical status of causation:
it is about whether causation exists in the external world, or not. Causal
realism can be characterised as follows:
Causation is something that occurs in an external reality. The
existence of causal relations does not depend on the presence of
minds, speakers, observers or the like.2
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The opposite position, causal constructivism is then characterised as
follows:
Causation is something that does not occur in an external reality.
The existence of causal relations depends on the presence of
minds, speakers, observers or the like.
In his essay on causality in the Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Jon
Williamson starts his discussion of the metaphysical status of causation
with the convenience thesis:
It is convenient to  represent the world in terms of cause and effect.
(2007, p 107)
The argument for the thesis is this:
It is convenient to represent the world in terms of cause and effect
because a causal representation, if correct, enables us to make
successful causal inferences: it allows us to make correct
predictions, correct diagnoses and successful strategic decisions.
(p. 107)
To the convenience thesis, Williamson adds the explanation thesis:
Humans think in terms of cause and effect because of this
convenience, not because there is something physical
corresponding to cause which humans experience. (p. 107)
This thesis sounds constructivist, but Williamson intends it to be weaker.
In his view, the convenience is a sufficient explanation for the existence
of causal beliefs: we don’t have to assume that causal relations exist in
order to explain the existence of causal beliefs. The convenience
explanation ensures that we are not forced to adopt real causal relations
as the only explanation of causal beliefs. It leaves open two possibilities:
The Explanation thesis divorces causal beliefs from any physical,
mind-independent notion of causality. While one might remain
agnostic as to whether there are physical causal relationships, one
might instead adopt an anti-physica l position, claiming that in the
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interests of ontological parsimony one should reject physical
causality. I leave the selection of an appropriate stance here
entirely open. (p. 107)
Williamson’s line of reasoning shows that causal realism is not trivially
true: the debate between causal realism and causal constructivism is a
real debate which deserves the attention of metaphysicians.
In Section 2, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the general
terms as we have done till now, is based on a false dilemma. In Section 4,
I will argue that the debate must be disentangled into several more
specific debates in order to be interesting.
2. A false dilemma
2.1 Ned Hall has recently argued that causation, “understood as a relation
between events”, comes in at least two basic and fundamentally different
varieties:
Events can stand  in one kind of causal relation - dependence - for
the explication of which the counterfactual analysis is perfectly
suited [namely, had c not occurred , e would not have occurred]
(...). And they can stand in an entirely different kind of causal
relation - production - which requires an entirely different kind of
causal analysis [namely, c produces e] (...). (2004, p. 226, cf. pp.
252-257; emphasis added)
If we put his view into a definition of causation, we get:
C causes E, if and only if, [E counterfactually depends on C] or
[there is a causal mechanism by which C produces E].
Hall argues that in some cases a reading in terms of production is
required, in yet some others a reading in terms of dependence, and, in
most cases, a reading in terms of both. Let us start with a quintessential
example from Hall, which is intended to give an example of a case where
only dependence is required:
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Suzy and Billy have grown up, just in time to get involved in
World War III. Suzy is piloting a bomber on a mission to blow up
an enemy target, and Billy is piloting a fighter as her lone escort.
Along comes an enemy fighter plane, piloted by Enemy. Sharp-
eyed Billy spots Enemy, zooms in, pulls the trigger, and Enemy’s
plane goes down in flames. Suzy’s mission is undisturbed, and the
bombing takes place as planned. If Billy hadn’t pulled the trigger,
Enemy would have eluded him and shot down Suzy,  and the
bombing would not have happened. (p. 241)
Billy’s pulling the trigger did not produce the bombing, rather it
neutralized a state-of-affairs that would have prevented the effect from
occurring. The occurrence of the bombing was dependent on Billy’s
pulling the trigger, but not produced by it. In this example, the effect
counterfactually depends on the cause, but there is no mechanism linking
cause and effect. Counterfactual dependence “seems to be the only
appropriate causal relation for such “negative events” to stand in” (2004,
p. 256). Hall counters the obvious counter-response that would read this
example in mechanistic terms, as follows:
A remarkably frequent but entirely unsatisfactory response is the
following: Billy’s action is connected to the bombing via a
spatiotemporally continuous causal chain – it’s just that this chain
consists, in part, of omissions (namely, the various failures of
Enemy to do what he would have done, had Billy not fired). (...)
For there is no reason to believe that the region of spacetime these
omiss ions occupy intersects the region of spacetime that Suzy and
her bomber actually occupy; to hold otherwise is just to mistake
this region with the region she would have occupied, had Billy not
fired. (p. 243)
In other cases there is a causal mechanism but no counterfactual
dependence. Suppose that Billy and Suzy are engaged in a competition to
see who can shatter a target bottle first. Suppose further that Suzy throws
her rock a split second before Billy. Suzy’s throw is spatiotemporally
connected to the shattering in the right way, but Billy’s is not:
Suzy’s throw is a cause of the shattering, but Billy’s is not. Indeed,
every one of the events that constitute the trajectory of Suzy’s rock
on its way to the bottle is a cause of the shattering. But the
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shattering depends on none of these events, since had they not
occurred the bottle would have scattered anyway, thanks to Billy’s
expert throw. (p. 235)
This example shows that counterfactual dependence is only one of two
possible forms of causation: there are cases in which there is causation
but no counterfactual dependence..
An important aspect of Hall’s view is that in typical cases of
causation, both relations are present and production and dependence
coincide (2004, p. 254 and p. 265). So though the relations are
conceptually distinct, in the actual world their extensions overlap in most
cases. Atypical cases of causation occur where there is a production
relation without counterfactual dependence (e.g. overdetermination cases
like the rock throwing) or where there is a relation of counterfactual
dependence without a production relation (e.g. double prevention cases
like Suzy’s bombing raid).
2.2 Hall’s dualistic theory of causation can be given a realistic
interpretation. Such realistic interpretation consists in (i) the claim that
the production relation is a real relation in the world, and (ii) the claim
that the counterfactual dependence relation is a real relation in the world.
Such a realist interpretation leads to a metaphysical puzzle: why are the
extensions of these two metaphysically real but different relations
approximately the same? The most plausible answer is that there is an
unknown relation – the causal relation – which has the following
properties:
(1) The presence of the causal relation usually (but not always) leads to
the presence of a production relation. Its absence usually (but not always)
leads to the absence of a production relation.
(2) The presence of the causal relation usually (but not always) leads to
the presence of a counterfactual dependence relation. Its absence usually
(but not always) leads to the absence of a counterfactual dependence
relation.
This interpretation is by no means the only one. It is also possible
to regard the production relation as a real relation in the world, and
counterfactual dependence as a convenient human construction, or the
other way around. Or one can regard both relations as human
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3 These examples are taken from Froeyman & Weber (ms.)
constructions. Let us look at a philosopher – Phil Dowe –  who chooses
the first option.
2.3 Process theories of causation (e.g. Dowe 2000 and Dowe 2004) posit
some sort of physical or material connection between causes and their
effects. These theories experience difficulties when applied to causation
by omission (cases where something that does not happen causes
something) or prevention (cases where something causes something not
to happen). Because of the absence of a physical or material connection
in these cases, process theories fail to regard them as instances of
causation, which leads to a number of judgments that are very
counterintuitive, and, maybe even worse, seem to contradict science at
some points. Consider the following examples.3 If we stick to a process
theory of causation none of these propositions can be true:
(1) A student’s laziness (not studying enough) is the cause of his
failing an examination.
(2) The fact that I forgot to close the refrigerator is the cause of my
ice cream melting.
(3) The absence of vitamine C causes a person to have scurvy.
(from Schaffer 2004, p. 202)
(4) The failure of delivering a piece of machinery in time causes a
machine to break down. (from Schaffer 2004, p. 201)
(5) The fact that I did not give my pet plant any water caused its
death.
(6) A father pushing his child out of the way of a speeding car
saved the child’s life (i.e. causes it not to die).
(7) A father not pushing his child out of the way of a speeding car
is the cause of its death.
(8) I caused the terrorist attack in London by failing to report
information that I had about it. (from Dowe 2004, p. 191) 
Counterfactual or counterfactual-based theories about causation have the
opposite problem. They are forced to regard a large number of causal
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propositions as true, despite the fact that they are intuitively false. For
example:
(9) My not throwing a rock causes the window not to break. (from
Dowe 2004, p. 191)
(10) You not throwing a rock causes the window not to break.
(from Dowe 2004, p. 189)
(11) I caused the terrorist attack in London by failing to be in a
pub where I could have overheard the plot, and by failing to travel
to the UK and blowing up the terrorist’s van. (from Dowe 2004, p.
191)
(12) The fact that you did not give my pet plant any water is the
cause of its death.
(13) The fact that it did not rain and that my roof did not leak is the
cause of my plant’s death.
The problems of the counterfactual approach can be easily solved if we
acknowledge that our ordinary causal talk is determined by
considerations of accuracy (these relate to the relation of our causal
claims with the world) and considerations of adequacy (these relate to
the reason our purpose we have when uttering a causal claim). This idea
is certainly not new. We find it e.g. in John Mackie’s The Cement of the
Universe. He says that, if something is a cause in his sense (INUS
condition plus causal priority) it is possible that:
… mention of this fact happens to be irrelevant, or less relevant
than mention of some other cause of the same result, to some
current purpose. (1974, p. 36)
If we apply the idea of adequacy relative to the purposes of causal
claims, the problems mentioned above can be solved. The difference
between (8) and (11) for example consists in the fact that, if you have
information about an upcoming terrorist attack, we usually expect you to
make it public. The fact that you did not make this information public, is
important the context of determining legal, moral and/or social
responsibility. We do not expect you to know in which pub the plot is
being made, and we certainly cannot expect you to be accidentally in this
pub at the right moment. These facts are not important in the context of
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determining responsibility. In the same sense, not throwing a rock is
usually not considered a cause of the not breaking of a window, because
people are usually not expected to throw rocks at windows (unless they
suffer from a sort of compulsive rock-throwing obsession). If you own a
plant, you are expected to give it enough water (as well as knowing more
or less how much water it needs).
In his 2004 paper, Phil Dowe proposes to call intuitively
acceptable cases of prevention and omission quasi-causation, as opposed
to genuine causation, which presupposes a physical connection between
cause and effect. This pair of concepts allows us to preserve a
metaphysical distinction, while the overarching generic concept (“cause”
without qualification) accounts for our ordinary causal talk.
2.4 Let us compare Dowe with Hall. For Dowe, the core of Hall’s
dualism (the definition “C causes E, if and only if, [E counterfactually
depends on C] or [there is a causal mechanism by which C produces E]”)
is acceptable as a conceptual analysis of ordinary causal talk. However,
he will say that only the first relation refers to something in the real
world. His metaphysical position is an intermediate one:
Some types of causation occur in an external reality. The existence
of causal relations of these types does not depend on the presence
of minds, speakers, observers or the like. Other types of causation
do not occur in an external reality.
This is a third possible position (besides the two positions mentioned in
the introduction), which cannot be neglected. If one neglects this
possibility, the debate is ill-constructed, because it rests on a false
dilemma.
3. A range of more specific debates
3.1 The intermediate position described in 2.4 is very vague. To start
with, it can cover Dowe’s position, but also the converse (where
counterfactual relations are seen as real, while process causation is seen
as a fiction). Furthermore, causation may involve more than two
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relations. Hall himself indicates that dualism might not be enough. He
gives the following counterexample to his own theory:
[T]here are certain kinds of cases that we have some inclination to
call cases of causation, but that also elude classification in terms of
production or dependence. Here is an example, a slight variation
on the story of Billy, Suzy and Enemy: This time, there is a second
fighter plane escorting Suzy. Billy shoots down Enemy exactly as
before, but if he hadn’t, the second escort would have. (2004, p.
271) 
This example is an instance of preempted double prevention; in this case
it is no longer true that the bombing wouldn’t have happened if Billy
hadn’t pulled the trigger. Hall admits that one will nonetheless be
inclined to grant Billy some causal responsibility for the success of the
bombing, just as when there was no second escort. Cases like Hall’s
example with the second escort can be dealt with by means of a
probabilistic theory of causation. So we could add a third relation, viz.
unconditional probabilistic dependence to Hall’s definition. That results
in the following:
C causes E, if and only if, [E counterfactually depends on C] or
[there is a causal mechanism by which C produces E] or [there is
an unconditional probabilistic dependence relation between C and
E].
As soon as we add a third relation in the conceptual analysis, the number
of possible metaphysical positions that qualify as intermediate increases
from two (Dowe’s position and its converse) to six. If there happen to be
more distinct causal relations, the number of positions increases in an
obvious way.
Given the possibility of six intermediate positionS and two
extreme ones, the debate the metaphysical status of causation should be
split up into the following three debates:
(1) Does causation in the counterfactual sense really exist?
(2) Does causation in the process sense really exist?
(3) Does causation in the sense of unconditional probabilistic
dependence really exist?
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One’s position in these more specific debates automatically determines
one’s general metaphysical position with respect to causation.
3.2 In Tooley (1986) a singularist account of causation is characterised as
a positive answer to the following question:
[I]s it possible for two events to be causally related, without the
relationship being an instance of some causal law, either basic or
derived, an either probabilistic or non-probabilistic (p. 271)
Note that this question presupposes that there are causal relations at two
levels: causal laws and causal relations between particular events. The
question is whether relations of the last type can occur in cases where
there is no relation of the first type. Both singularists and their opponents
(the adherents of the so-called supervenience view), are realists about
causation in a double sense: causal laws and singular causation. This
double realism is a presupposition of their debate.
However, this presupposition can be challenged. Suppose that I
accept that type-level causation is adequately characterised by a
probabilistic conception. Take for instance the following definitions,
which constitute the core of Ronald Giere’s theory of probabilistic
causation in populations:
C is a positive causal factor for E in the population U whenever
PX(E) is greater than PK(E).
C is a negative causal factor for E in the population U whenever
PX(E) is less than PK(E).
C is causally irrelevant for E in the population U whenever PX(E)
is equal to PK(E). (Giere 1997, p. 204)
Though it can be extended to other types of variables, Giere considers
only binary variables. So in his definitions, C is a variable with two
values (C and not-C); the same for E (values E and not-E). X is the
hypothetical population which is obtained by changing, for every
member of U that exhibits the value not-C, the value into C. K is the
analogous hypothetical population in which all individuals that exhibit C
are changed into not-C. PX(E) and PK(E) are the probability of E in
respectively X and K. 
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An example might clarify this. If we claim that smoking (C) is a
positive causal factor for lung cancer (E) in the Belgian population (U),
this amounts to claiming that if every inhabitant of Belgium were forced
to smoke there would be more lung cancer patients in Belgium than if
everyone were forbidden to smoke. Conversely for the claim that
smoking is a negative causal factor. Causal irrelevance is a relation
between variables (represented in bold) rather than a relation between
values of a variable (like the first two relations). If we claim that
“smoking behaviour” (C) is causally irrelevant for “the occurrence or
absence of lung cancer” (E) this means that we believe that in the two
hypothetical populations the incidence of lung cancer is equally high.
It is perfectly possible to accept that this theory captures the way
causation is used in the sciences, and at the same time be an anti-realist
about these causal relations. In that case, we regard them as useful
fictions (e.g. useful for policy). A possible argument for such a
constructivist position could be that the definitions refer to hypothetical
worlds. So one has to be a modal realist in order to accept them as
descriptions of a real relations. 
Such constructivism at the type-level can be combined with
realism at the singular level, for instance by accepting the view that
singular causation is causal mechanical (and claiming that these are real
relations in the world, see Section 3.1). Given the coherence of this
intermediate position, it is better to split up the debate on causal realism
in two subordinate debates, dealing with the following questions:
(1N) Does singular causation really exist?
(2N) Are there causal laws in the real world?
4. Conclusion
I have argued that,  in order to avoid a false dilemma, we have to take
into account an intermediate position in the debate between causal
realists and casual constructivists:
Some types of causation occur in an external reality. The existence
of causal relations of these types does not depend on the presence
of minds, speakers, observers or the like. Other types of causation
do not occur in an external reality.
ERIK WEBER70
I have also shown that the debate is better split up into several smaller
debates, along two lines. On the one hand, we have subdebates based on
the type of causal relation::
(1) Does causation in the counterfactual sense really exist?
(2) Does causation in the process sense really exist?
(3) Does causation in the sense of unconditional probabilistic
dependence really exist?
On the other hand, we have subdebates based on the level of causation:
(1N) Does singular causation really exist?
(2N) Are there causal laws in the real world?
There are important open questions about how do these two
strands of subdebates relate to each other. Can they be treated
independently of one another? Does it matter where we start? Do we
have to make further subdivisions by combining the two strands?
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